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Chapter 8
Thinking about Funding Federal
Retirement Plans
Toni Hustead
This chapter takes up the question of how to think about retirement plans
for Federal employees. In the United States, a Federal retirement plan is
one established or maintained by a Federal agency for any of its officers or
employees. There are currently almost 34 Federal pension plans covering
more than 10 million individual participants including employees, retirees,
and survivors. In practice, since more than 97 percent of these members
are concentrated in three plans, these are the focus of this chapter (GAO
1996). Two of the three plans which cover over 5 million participants
are for Federal civilian employees. The Civil Service Retirement System
(CSRS) covers civilian employees who entered service before 1984. The
Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS) covers all new hires after
1983, plus employees who elected to transfer from CSRS to FERS during
one of the two open seasons. The third plan, covering more than 4 million
participants, is the Department of Defense (DoD) Military Retirement
System.
A brief history of Federal retirement plan funding
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 set
minimum funding and reporting standards for corporate or private-sector
pension systems. This law requires private firms to fully fund these pension
plans by holding investments other than their own securities, to protect
employees against the loss of earned benefits if the companies were to go
out of business. Public Law 95–595, enacted in 1978, extended most of
the reporting requirements of ERISA to Federal retirement plans. That
law did not extend the funding and investment requirements of ERISA
to Federal plans, because the presumption was and continues to be that
the Federal government will not go out of business. In addition, reneging
on promised pension benefits to Federal civilian employees (including
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members of Congress) or military members is not considered a viable possi-
bility. Currently, annual payments to Federal retirees are a small proportion
of the overall Federal budget each year. For example, in FY 2007, Federal
retirement benefits were $ 0.1 trillion (3.7%) of the $2.7 trillion net Federal
outlays (OMB 2007).
Prior to this adoption of the ERISA-like reporting standard, most Federal
retirement plans were either not funded, which means they pay benefits
when due without any fund accumulations (referred to as ‘pay-as-you-go’),
or partially funded. For standard reporting purposes under the new law,
each plan was required to determine and report to the public its unfunded
liability and the annual cost of the benefit accrued by current employees.
To determine these costs, most plans used the most common actuarial
funding method used by large private employers at that time, the entry-
age normal cost method. The reports were ultimately incorporated into
the financial statements of the agencies.
These reports became instrumental in educating the public and policy-
makers on the true cost of Federal civilian and military employees, and
they are likely the reason that pay-as-you-go financing was replaced with
fully funded mechanisms in the 1980s for some of the larger systems. To
fully fund each system, Congress passed legislation that set up unique
Federal Trust Funds that annually receive payments to cover the benefits
earned during the year as well as annual amortization payments to pay
off the unfunded liabilities. The assets of the Trust Funds are invested
in Federal securities, so the funds also receive annual investment income.
Benefits payments are made out of the fund to plan participants. Hence,
these Federal capital assets back the promises made to plan participants.
In 1984, the existing Military Retirement System was fully funded. By con-
trast, the financing of the Civil Service Retirement System has not been
changed. Since 1984, nearly all new major entitlements for civilian and
military employees enacted have included legislative language that fully
funds the new benefits. These include the new civilian Federal Employees
Retirement System in 1984, new military education benefits for reservists
in 1985, a new military retirement plan for those entering service after
mid-1986, and a new plan to cover health benefits for military retirees over
age 64 in 2001. Under these ‘accrual budgeting’ arrangements, Federal
agencies transfer funds from their own budgets to the relevant Trust Funds
equaling the benefits earned in that year, and Treasury is responsible
for making unfunded liability payments to the funds as well and inter-
est income payments. Agency budget appropriations include the accrual
funds needed to make such transfers, and hence, they reflect a more
‘transparent’ view of the true cost of each Department’s manpower and
decisions.
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Federal retirement fund assets
Federal retirement assets must be held by law in plan-specific Trust Funds
that are invested in special issue US Treasury securities that yield interest
comparable to marketable US obligations with similar maturities. Fund
managers ensure that there is enough cash in the funds each year to
cover benefits, and they invest all excess income over this amount. When
securities are redeemed by fund managers to pay benefits, the Treasury
either borrows from the public or uses then current tax receipts to cover its
security obligation. When funds are moved from one account in the Federal
government to another account there are equal and opposite accounting
transactions that cancel each other out in the overall Federal financial
statement. For example, when an agency transfers cash from its account
to the Trust Fund, it is a debit to the agency and a credit to the Trust
Fund for an equal amount, and the transactions cancel each other out
inside the overall Federal budget. Likewise, when a Trust Fund invests
excess cash in Federal securities, it is a debit to the Trust Fund and a credit
to the Treasury, and these two transactions cancel each other out inside
the overall Federal budget. When the Trust Fund pays benefits to plan
participants, there is a debit but no associated credit in the Federal budget.
Hence, while Trust Fund balances grow to large levels, the fact that they are
‘self-invested’ means that the overall Federal budget does not need to have
the cash on hand until benefits fall due. This makes the process appear
to be only a bookkeeping mechanism, since the end result is that Federal
funding does not allow for the transfer of liabilities from future generations
of taxpayers to today’s taxpayers.
If the US government were to change the Federal Trust Fund invest-
ment policy from US Treasury special issue securities to private sector
securities, this would result in significant new Federal budget outlays that
would directly impact the Federal deficit. For example, at the end of FY
2007, all Federal Trust Fund balances equaled $3.7 trillion, and they are
expected to increase by an average of $0.3 trillion a year over the next
six years. These numbers are large because they include Social Security
and Medicare Trust Funds. Focusing only on civilian and military retire-
ment plans, the Federal Trust Fund balances equaled $0.9 trillion, and are
expected to increase by an average of $0.1 trillion annually. Converting
these current and/or future fund assets into private assets in the cur-
rent deficit situation, would mean that the government would have to
immediately borrow the money from the public (increasing the deficit),
find an uncontroversial portfolio in which to invest these large sums, and
then run the risk that the planned return on investment would be insuf-
ficient to cover obligations as they fall due. Investing trillions of dollars
of Federal funds in the private market would also raise fears of political
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interference in private corporations or place unwanted mandates on
investments.
There are two groups of funds in the unified budget of the Federal
government: Trust Funds and Federal Funds. Total Trust Fund outlays
resulted in a $248.7 billion surplus in FY 2007, but federal fund outlays
had a deficit of $410.7 billion for a combined total unified budget deficit
of $162 billion.
The FY 2009 President’s Budget stated that the Federal government
would only be able to fund benefits in the true sense of the word by increas-
ing saving and investment in the economy as a whole. It went on to state
that this could only be accomplished if annual Trust Fund surpluses were
not used to reduce the unified budget deficit, and if Federal fund deficits
were unchanged. This would reduce Federal borrowing and increase future
incomes and economic sources to support benefits, as long as this savings
is not accompanied by a reduction in private savings. The FY 2009 budget
did not envision this happening anytime soon, as the deficit for that budget
year was projected to increase to $407.4 billion despite nearly a $300 billion
Trust Fund surplus (OMB 2008).
If only a bookkeeping exercise, why ‘fully fund’
Federal pension plans?
Though fully funding Federal pension plans is recognized as bookkeeping
exercise, the move to accrual budgeting has been embraced by policy-
makers, budget experts, and accounting organizations because it makes
the cost of personnel transparent. With accrual budgeting, decisions on
whether to increase hiring, enhance benefits, or use contractor support
must be made with a full recognition of the total cost. For example, if a
decision were made to double the size of the military force in FY 2009,
the DoD budget would need an additional $17 billion to cover the new
retirement accrual obligations in that year alone. If the accrual budgeting
of the Military Retirement System were dismantled and replaced with a
cash ‘pay-as-you go’ system, then the DoD would not have had to consider
the cost of retirement benefits for the new personnel in its decision or its
budget, as they would not show up for another 20 years (DoD 2006).
Several branches of the Federal government have supported the move
to transparency. The President’s FY 2003 Budget proposed to move all
of the remaining Federal pension and retiree health benefits not yet
fully funded to an accrual budgeting basis. This would have ensured
that the employer’s share of the annual cost of all Federal pensions and
retiree health benefits would be reflected in the human resource budgets
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of those agencies where employees worked. The Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) Controller stated that it was the right time for such
an improvement, given the increased sensitivity to the need for accu-
racy and transparency in accounting. The Comptroller General of the
US and Chair of the Joint Financial Management Improvement Program
(JFMIP) also issued a supportive statement on behalf of the JFMIP Princi-
pals stating that including these accrual costs in data used for budgetary
decision-making would enhance the planning and the evaluation of the
cost of operations, and improve consistency, transparency, and account-
ability for results. Similar statements were issued by the Association of
Government Accountants and the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants.
These efforts to improve budgetary reporting were not favored by all.
Congress did not pass legislation to enact the Administration’s proposal in
FY 2003 or in later years. In fact, there were several attempts by the Armed
Services Committees to reverse DoD accrual budgeting and to reduce the
transparency of the true cost of military manpower, by transferring certain
defense accrual costs to the Department of Treasury and spending the
resulting excess DoD appropriation on other projects. Such a move would
have directly increased the budget deficit by the total accrual amount since
it would have increased Federal outlays to the public.
The first Congressional attempt to alter accrual budgeting was success-
ful. In 2003, Congress increased military retirement benefits for certain
members receiving monthly Veterans Affairs (VA) disability benefits, and
it required the Department of the Treasury to pay the annual marginal
accrual increase associated with the new benefits instead of DoD. In FY
2007, for example, this gimmick understated DoD’s annual manpower costs
by $2.5 billion (4.7% of basic payroll) and increased the deficit by a like
amount (DoD 2006). The second Congressional attempt to alter accrual
budgeting was enacted in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY
2005. Section 725 of this law eliminated the requirement for DoD to use
annual appropriations to pay the accruing cost of post-retirement health
care for retirees over age 65, and it also transferred the requirement to
the Department of Treasury. However, both the Office of Management
and Budget and the Congressional Budget Committees have continued to
charge the cost of this legislation against the DoD appropriation, essentially
nullifying the intent of the enacted budget change. Without such a united
agreement on technical scoring, this law would have caused the deficit
to increase by more than $60 billion over five years or required enact-
ment of offsetting reductions of the same magnitude in Federal programs
(US Senate 2006).
Two years later, the House Armed Services Committee again included
similar language in its version of the Defense Authorization Act for FY 2007,
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and this time the proposed bill included language that would have made
it difficult for OMB and the Congressional Budget Committees to charge
the legislation against the DoD appropriation. The Senate version of the
bill did not include the accrual change so, before the bill was conferenced,
letters of strong opposition to the House version were written to the House
and Senate Armed Services Committees by the Office of Management
and Budget, the Secretary of Defense, the Department of Treasury, the
Senate and House Budget Committees, and the Senate Appropriations
Committee. The letters cited the $11 billion annual windfall that DoD
would reap that would increase the deficit, as well as the importance of
transparent costs in the budgets of Federal agencies. As a result of this
strong opposition, the final enacted law dropped the language to remove
DoD’s accrual obligation (US Senate 2006).
Conclusion
Most US Federal retirement plans are now fully funded. Nevertheless, as
the plan assets must legally be invested in Federal securities, fund surpluses
are used to lower the overall Federal government budget deficit. As a result,
unlike the private sector, current taxpayers are not charged with the cost of
future Federal retirement obligations.
Since private-sector plans are not allowed to invest in company invest-
ments, full funding does result in charging current management with the
cost of future retirement obligations. However, similar to the private sector,
Federal funding does require the employing Federal agency to budget
for the accruing liability of retirement for its current personnel. Policy
decisions regarding the number of Federal civilian and military personnel
and the design of their retirement benefits are then made with a better
understanding of the cost. If decisions are made to increase personnel or
benefits, then offsetting savings must be found in order to live within both
agency and Federal budget totals. This allows for more fiscal security in the
long-term.
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